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AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS OR SHORTAGE?: RECONCILING 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP WITH FREE MARKET SOLUTIONS OVER 
THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Anthony W. Cosgrove* 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the United States low-income families are having an 
increasingly difficult time finding an affordable place to live.1 Due to high 
rents, static incomes, and a shortage of housing, local communities, 
particularly in urban areas, are struggling to fight off this wave of decline and 
displacement.2 Currently in the United States an estimated 12 million 
families are now spending more than half of their income on rent.3 According 
to Federal Guidelines, “[f]amilies who pay more than 30 percent of their 
income for housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty 
affording necessities such as food, clothing, transportation, and medical 
care.”4 
A large reason for low-income families’ overspending in this way is that 
the supply of affordable housing is shrinking.5 Landlords and tenants are both 
adding to the affordable housing problem as “all sides are being squeezed.”6 
Today most new construction of rental housing is for the high-end market, 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Anthony Cosgrove is a third-year law student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 
graduating May, 2019. He would like to thank all who helped on this Note, especially the Fifth Floor 
Barco Crew. 
1 Pam Fessler, Why Affordable Housing Could Become Harder to Find, NPR (Jan. 9, 2018, 
4:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/09/576535681/advocates-fear-tax-bill-will-worsen-u-s-
affordable-housing-shortage. 
2 Id. 
3 Affordable Housing, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/ 
affordablehousing/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
4 Id. 
5 Fessler, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
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“not for low and middle-income families.”7 So while the problem is clear, its 
cause is anything but. 
This Note seeks a better understanding of the current housing problems 
plaguing local communities around the United States. Whether it is 
attributable to a crisis of societal construction or a shortage in the supply of 
affordable housing, this note attempts to reconcile current legal scholarship 
on local government initiatives, and economic free market solutions to lower 
barriers. 
Part I of this Note examines the historical background of government 
initiatives to promote local development primarily through the mechanism of 
eminent domain. Frequently one of the first tools used from the local 
government toolkit, eminent domain has evolved over the past century 
together with a shroud of controversy over its use. Part II details the current 
problems associated with local governments’ use of eminent domain, 
particularly regarding its effectiveness (or lack thereof) in accomplishing the 
government’s intended policy. Part III observes many of the incentives local 
governments are using beyond eminent domain and examines their 
effectiveness in redeveloping their communities for all classes of residents. 
Part IV reviews current proposals of legal and government-side 
solutions including “inclusionary” eminent domain, Community Benefits 
Agreements (CBAs), and Community Development Corporations (CDCs). 
Part V proposes alternatives to these regulatory proposals through market-
oriented solutions based on increasing the overall supply in the market 
through deregulation of the zoning and permitting process. Exploring case 
studies in Durham, North Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; and Anaheim, 
California, this Note will make the case that the solution to creating more 
affordable housing can be found in a reconciliation of both the 
legal/government and market-based proposals. Part VI offers this 
reconciliation and provides a comparative study of a proposal first 
implemented in Rotterdam, Netherlands, and its potential application to local 
governments in the United States. Lastly, the Note concludes by describing 
how local governments should help alleviate the affordable housing problem 
in light of the reconciliation of government and market-based solutions. 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 Id. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
A. Doctrinal Establishment of Eminent Domain 
In the United States, the federal government’s power of eminent domain 
has long been used to acquire property for public use and was directly 
attributed to its rights as a sovereignty.8 Presuming a government’s right to 
acquire land as an exercise of its sovereignty, the United States Constitution 
regulated the exercise of such a right by attaching a responsibility to the 
government to justly compensate the land owner for the fair market value of 
the property.9 Thus the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”10 
The first challenge to the federal government’s eminent domain power 
came in 1876 in Kohl v. United States. In Kohl, the Court found that the right 
of eminent domain exists in the federal government of the United States, and 
may be exercised by it within the States so far as is necessary to the 
enjoyment of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution.11 The Court 
opined that “[t]he right [of eminent domain] is the offspring of political 
necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty.”12 The Court continued: 
[i]f the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the 
unwillingness of property holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a 
sale to the Federal government, the constitutional grants of power may be rendered 
nugatory, and the government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will 
of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be.13 
The Court further articulated that the proper view of the right of eminent 
domain is as a right belonging to the federal government under its power as 
a sovereignty to take private property for its own public uses and not for those 
of another,14 and that the right includes both the exercise by purchase or 
condemnation.15 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https:// 
www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-domain (last visited Mar. 6, 2018) (citing Boom Co. 
v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1879)). 
9 Id. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
11 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1876). 
12 Id. at 371–72. 
13 Id. at 371. 
14 Id. at 373–74. 
15 Id. at 374. 
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B. Eminent Domain for Redevelopment 
Many decades later, in Berman v. Parker, the Court first tackled a 
challenge to the constitutionality of whether redevelopment was a public 
purpose falling within the acceptable uses of the federal government’s 
exercise of eminent domain. The Court found that a legislative act, the 
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, was constitutional as 
applied regarding the use of eminent domain pursuant to a comprehensive 
development plan for the redevelopment of a large area to eliminate and 
prevent slum and substandard housing conditions.16 The Court found that 
“[m]iserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread 
disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by 
reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed 
make living an almost insufferable burden.”17 Ultimately, the Court 
determined that the role of the judiciary in determining whether the power of 
eminent domain is being exercised for a public purpose is “an extremely 
narrow one”18 and that it should be within the purview of the legislature to 
determine that a community should be “beautiful as well as healthy, [and] 
spacious as well as clean. . . .”19 Therefore, the Court found that “[t]he 
concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive” and that redevelopment of 
slums and blighted communities properly fits into the constraints to when a 
government may use eminent domain.20 
Along with determining that redevelopment of blighted areas fits within 
the constitutional responsibility applied toward governments, the Court also 
extended the use of eminent domain further than to just those properties that 
were blighted, finding that “community redevelopment programs need not, 
by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by 
building.”21 The Court reasoned that if an individual owner was “permitted 
to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular 
property was not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954). 
17 Id. at 32–33. 
18 Id. at 32 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
19 Id. at 33. 
20 Id. at 34. 
21 Id. at 35. 
2018] AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS OR SHORTAGE? 87 
 
Vol. 37, No. 1 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.156 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
redevelopment would suffer greatly.”22 Under the legislature’s decision, the 
entire area within the redevelopment zone needed redesigning “so that a 
balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the region.”23 Essentially, 
the Court allowed the taking of non-blighted properties to fit within the 
design of the redevelopment area under a completely heightened sense of 
judicial deference toward exercises of eminent domain. 
C. A New Level of Judicial Deference 
The heightened level of deference given to legislatures over exercises 
of eminent domain seemed to reach a climax in the landmark case of Kelo v. 
City of New London, where eminent domain for a public purpose was not 
limited to the redevelopment of slums and blighted areas within a zone for 
residential purposes, but instead permitted for the initiative of economic 
development of the surrounding areas, which the Court deemed a public 
purpose. In Kelo, the city of New London approved a redevelopment plan 
submitted by a development agent to revitalize an area along the waterfront 
in the city.24 The plan called for the use of eminent domain to acquire the 
remainder of currently owned property in the redevelopment zone that was 
unable to be purchased on the open market.25 The Court found that the 
redevelopment plan served the public purpose of economic rejuvenation, 
which constituted a public use under the Fifth Amendment and was therefore 
entitled to judicial deference.26 Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice 
Kennedy found that “[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined [public use] 
broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments in this field.”27 
By expanding the acceptable definition of “public use” under the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court in Kelo effectively rejected the contention that the 
mere fact that the property was transferred to private individuals immediately 
after condemnation diminished the “public character of the taking.”28 Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 34. 
24 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005). 
25 Id. at 472. 
26 Id. at 476. 
27 Id. at 480. 
28 Id. at 482. 
88 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 37:83 
 
Vol. 37, No. 1 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.156 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Kennedy reasoned that “[q]uite simply, the government’s pursuit of a public 
purpose will often benefit individual private parties,”29 and it cannot be said 
“that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes 
of community redevelopment projects.”30 The Court found that “[i]t is only 
the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics that matters in determining public 
use.”31 
In reasoning to defend its heightened deference, the Court articulated 
that “our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and 
intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in 
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”32 
According to the majority, “[t]he City has carefully formulated an economic 
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the 
community . . .”33 and that promoting economic development is a “traditional 
and long accepted function of government.”34 
D. Post-Kelo Reactions Towards the Use of Eminent Domain 
While the Supreme Court in Kelo stressed a high level of judicial 
deference to public use jurisprudence, the Court explicitly left the door open 
to states to place further restrictions on the exercise of takings power by 
governments within their state sovereignty.35 As a result, many states have 
scaled back the perceived power granted to local governments over the 
exercise of their eminent domain power from the Court in Kelo. For example, 
in California, a city may only take land for economic development purposes 
in blighted areas.36 In Florida, any political subdivision authorized with the 
power of eminent domain “may not exercise the power of eminent domain to 
take private property for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Id. at 485. 
30 Id. at 486 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 34). 
31 Id. at 482 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)); see also Berman, 348 
U.S. at 35–36 (“Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of 
land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in 
the discretion of the legislative branch.”). 
32 Id. at 483. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 484. 
35 Id. at 489. 
36 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33030–33037 (2010). 
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blight conditions.”37 Going further than a majority of the states, the Florida 
legislature overtly objected to the Court’s reasoning in Berman and 
invalidated the use of eminent domain for eliminating slum or blight 
conditions as a valid public purpose or use for which private property may 
be taken.38 
Pennsylvania occupies a middle ground between Florida and California, 
developed after Kelo, where a condemnor is authorized to use eminent 
domain on multiple units within a redevelopment area only if a majority of 
the units of property fall under certain conditions to be deemed blighted 
under statute.39 Such conditions include property that is: (1) declared a public 
nuisance; (2) an attractive nuisance to children; (3) a “dilapidated, 
unsanitary, unsafe vermin-infested” or failing under the building code; (4) a 
fire hazard; (5) tax delinquent for a period of two years; (6) abandoned; etc.40 
Thus, while many states have reacted to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kelo, views on the appropriate measures to take in response to the heightened 
level of judicial deference afforded to public takings varies significantly. 
More recently, national debate over eminent domain since Kelo spans 
from its practicality in its ability to spurn effective development in low 
income areas, to issues arising over what the proper interpretation of “just 
compensation” should be. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied a 
certiorari petition in S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau.41 The case involved 
the question of whether or not the government must pay entrepreneurs if it 
destroys their businesses by acquiring the land used for the business via 
eminent domain.42 States are split on this issue, even though it seems like a 
basic principle of fairness—i.e. pay for the value of what you take—though 
many courts have found otherwise.43 Thus, the issues surrounding local 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.014(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2018). 
38 Id. 
39 26 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 205 (West 2009). 
40 Id. 
41 S. Lafourche Levee Dist. v. Jarreau, 217 So. 3d 298 (La. 2017). 
42 Id. 
43 Compare Redevelopment Auth. of Phila. v. Lieberman, 336 A.2d 249 (Pa. 1975) (ruling that the 
condemned party was owed compensation for the value of his liquor license which was lost when the 
condemnor acquired his property through eminent domain), with City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 
734 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. 2007) (holding that the condemner’s requirements to provide just compensation 
were satisfied even if the identified relocation sites were not to the condemned’s liking as relocation 
assistance benefits do not have a direct relationship with fair market value of a tenant’s interest). 
90 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 37:83 
 
Vol. 37, No. 1 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.156 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
governments’ use of eminent domain have not been settled by the Kelo 
ruling; instead more fervent debate over its merits have developed over what 
Kelo could mean for the future of eminent domain.  
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH EMINENT DOMAIN AND 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
When cities use their eminent domain power to advance development 
projects, it rarely includes affordable housing.44 Across the country “[a]s the 
need for affordable housing increases, cities’ taking of private property for 
‘public purposes’ has helped decrease the number of affordable housing units 
instead of helping keep up with the demand.”45 Regarding uses of eminent 
domain in blight removal, local governments are often criticized further 
because instead of creating more affordable housing in place of the blighted 
communities they remove, they “have a history of replacing low-income 
housing with housing that [is] too expensive for the current residents.”46 
Adding to these complications, typically “[a]s housing prices and rents 
have increased at astronomical rates . . . the income levels of low income 
households have not kept up proportionately, thus making private sector, 
non-government-subsidized rental units less affordable.”47 This has created 
economic problems for cities due to the fact that the impact that an affordable 
housing shortage can have on the economic vitality of a city is directly 
correlated to the potential disruptions in the labor pool that a shortage of 
housing can have on low income workers who would not be able to live and 
thereby work in the cities from which they were displaced.48 This seemingly 
                                                                                                                           
 
44 Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent Domain and Affordable Housing, 46 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 842 (2006). 
45 Id.; see also id. at 856–57 (“Not only do cities fail to use their eminent domain power to build 
more affordable housing units, but they often use their power to raze them. Cities often take property that 
has existing affordable housing units owned and operated by private owners. These units are oftentimes 
inexpensive, private-sector housing that do not have ties to government-subsidy programs. They are, 
nevertheless, ‘affordable’ housing units in the sense that low-income residents can afford to rent them and 
live within the city. By taking such affordable housing units off the market by their exercise of eminent 
domain power, cities reduce the available housing stock for low-income residents as such units are usually 
replaced by new high-end commercial, residential, and mixed-use projects.”). 
46 Emma Westbrook Perry, Note, No Room for the Poor—the Blight of Eminent Domain on 
America’s Lowest Economic Classes, 94 TEX. L. REV. 155, 162 (2016). 
47 Parlow, supra note 44, at 848. 
48 Id. at 849. 
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forced exodus of low-income workers could wreak havoc on the daily 
operations of businesses within a city who depend on a labor pool willing to 
work for modest wages.49 
Under the current, broader view of the public use doctrine exemplified 
in Kelo, “the government may take private property and transfer it to another 
private party as long as the use will serve a public purpose.”50 Public purposes 
including the creation of jobs, economic development, and the “revitalization 
of blighted areas.”51 This public purpose justification “encourages exercises 
of eminent domain power that not only stymies efforts to increase affordable 
housing, but that actually reduce existing affordable housing stock.”52 The 
fact of the matter is that cities need the private sector’s assistance in building 
and managing housing projects. Still, a fear remains, particularly among legal 
scholars, that due to a proven history of cities using their eminent domain 
powers to benefit only private interests, engaging with the private sector will 
come at the cost of further hurting lower-income residents. 
It is often argued that the “government’s current wide-ranging power to 
condemn housing via blight removal projects can have significant long-
lasting effects on the low-income people who are disproportionately affected 
by these projects.”53 Yet, because local governments “receive a significant 
portion of their budget through sales and property taxes” they are therefore 
more likely “to advance projects that will increase such revenue”54 rather 
than focus their attention on projects that emphasize benefiting their low-
income residents. This relative distrust in local government’s ability to use 
their eminent domain power to promote the development of affordable 
housing is largely found in the contention that “[o]pportunities to create 
affordable housing . . . tend not to create new sales tax revenue and they do 
not maximize the potential property taxes that can be generated from a new 
development.”55 Therefore, the generalized incentive for local governments 
to exercise their eminent domain power to increase taxable revenues directly 
competes with the promotion of affordable housing.56 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 851. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 853. 
53 Perry, supra note 46, at 176. 
54 Parlow, supra note 44, at 854. 
55 Id. at 855–56. 
56 Id. 
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As this Note will go on to elaborate, the incentive for local governments 
to increase redevelopment to promote their tax base ends up with ineffective 
results. Therefore, if local governments’ purpose for using eminent domain 
to incentivize development is for tax generating purposes, then those 
incentives will prove unsuccessful. However, it is incorrect to conclude that 
it is impossible to use eminent domain for promoting affordable housing. 
Rather local governments need only to refocus their power of eminent 
domain in a more effective way.  
A. The Rise and Spread of Urban Decline 
Cities such as Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh have all lost 
“more than 40 percent of their populations over the last four decades.”57 
Urban decline occurs “when low [citywide] housing demand leads to 
population loss in the lowest-price neighborhoods, and falling prices allow 
lower-income households to move into formerly middle-income 
neighborhoods. As this happens, housing prices in those middle 
neighborhoods fall.”58 Concurrent with this decline, these cities have also 
seen “income growth in the top three housing-price deciles” within certain 
neighborhoods.59 Therefore, when higher-income residents move in, they are 
more likely to make improvements to the housing stock of that 
neighborhood,60 whereas when lower-income residents move in, “they may 
be more likely to defer home maintenance when finances are tight.”61 This 
creates a push-pull effect where cities are seeing “retreating boundaries of 
high income” neighborhoods as urban decline spreads throughout the 
remaining lower and middle-income neighborhoods.62 
In discussions regarding the affordable housing problem in the United 
States, one term often thrown around is gentrification. Simply put, 
“[g]entrification describes the socioeconomic upgrading of a previously, 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Daniel Hartley, Urban Decline in Rust-Belt Cities, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND: ECON. 
COMMENT (May 20, 2013), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-
commentary/2013-economic-commentaries/ec-201306-urban-decline-in-rust-belt-cities.aspx. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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low-income central city neighborhood, characterized by the influx of 
residents of a higher socioeconomic status relative to incumbent residents 
and rising home values and rents.”63 Often gentrification is criticized as the 
root cause for displacement of low-income families. However, “[t]he 
empirical evidence on the relationship between gentrification and residential 
displacement . . . is far from conclusive.”64 Instead, “at the aggregate level[,] 
movers out of gentrifying neighborhoods are no more likely to move to 
lower-income neighborhoods compared with those from non-gentrifying, 
low-income neighborhoods.”65 Nevertheless, while low income families are 
not necessarily more likely to move from gentrifying neighborhoods than 
similar residents in nongentrifying neighborhoods, the fact remains that low-
income families “have a higher risk of downward mobility” when they do 
move out of gentrifying neighborhoods.66 This creates a spread of urban 
decline which reaches into once middle-income neighborhoods and results in 
the retreating boundaries of high-income neighborhoods and the decline of 
home values across the large swaths of growing disadvantaged 
neighborhoods. 
Land values are usually calculated based on their “physical and 
locational attributes,” and what is often neglected “is the bundle of legal 
rights conveyed with land.”67 A component of the land value calculation are 
the options that a potential buyer has for their property. To better understand 
the option component of urban land values: 
[r]eal option theory implies that [1] raw land contains an option to develop the 
optimal structure at the optimal time (development option), [2] developed land 
contains an option to redevelop the existing improvements to a higher and better 
use (redevelopment option), and [3] both raw and developed land contain an 
option to sell or completely abandon the property (abandonment option).68 
Therefore, for a newly constructed property, the presumption is that its value 
reflects that it has been built to its most valuable, optimal use. Thus, since 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 Lei Ding, Jackelyn Hwang & Eileen Divringi, Gentrification and Residential Mobility in 
Philadelphia, 61 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 38, 38 (2016). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 39. 
66 Id. at 49. 
67 Henry J. Munneke & Kiplan S. Womack, Valuing the Redevelopment Option Component of 
Urban Land Values, REAL EST. ECON., Dec. 2016, at 1. 
68 Id. at 1–2. 
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the current property value and its “best use value” are equivalent at this point 
in time, “the redevelopment option would be zero.”69 However, over years 
when physical deterioration and obsolescence start to set in, the property 
value and “best use value” begin to inverse—for as the property value begins 
to depreciate, the redevelopment option value begins to increase.70 This cycle 
eventually leads to the property being far removed from its “best use” 
potential, and its current property value is then comprised almost entirely of 
its land value, which is in turn a direct reflection of its redevelopment option 
value.71 
Research indicates that prior improvements on properties purchased 
with the sole intent to immediately tear down do not contribute to the price 
of the property during sale.72 Instead it was solely land value and its 
associated redevelopment option that was being valued on the market. This 
ultimately demonstrates the rise of urban decline in many communities 
around the United States. Many local communities “lack sufficient incentives 
for redevelopment indicating little to no option value is observed.”73 In fact, 
“the redevelopment option value is estimated to be around 4% of a property’s 
selling price on average.”74 Thus, with little redevelopment option factored 
into the value of housing in unincentivized areas, urban decline spreads 
throughout low and middle income areas of the community as home values 
in those areas are seemingly being valued for only their land. In the end, this 
demonstrates that for local governments to curtail the spread of urban decline 
in their cities, they must find ways to promote incentives for redevelopment 
in areas throughout their locale including, but not exclusively, the potential 
exercise of eminent domain. Declining home values can promote more 
market development, but the push-pull dynamic in the market is eroding the 
middle of the housing-price-spectrum and creating a market with only two 
subsections—luxury high end, and everything else. This is the reason why 
only luxury units are being built today, which in turn exacerbates the spread 
of urban decline and the problem of affordable housing.  
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III. CURRENT TOOLS EMPLOYED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO 
INCENTIVIZE DEVELOPMENT 
When trying to incentivize development, local governments have 
employed many tools over the years besides eminent domain, with varied to 
little success. A quick survey of some of the tools most frequently used will 
demonstrate their past effectiveness (or lack thereof) as potential affordable 
housing solutions. 
A. Inclusionary Zoning 
Inclusionary zoning programs “either require developers to make a 
certain percentage of the units within their market-rate residential 
developments available at prices or rents that are affordable to specified 
income groups, or offer incentives that encourage them to do so.”75 
Advocates for such inclusionary zoning policies, including many legal 
scholars, argue that they can be “an effective means of producing below-
market-rate units that would not otherwise be produced and that, unlike 
traditional affordable housing programs, it does not require direct public 
subsidies and produces affordable units in a geographically dispersed 
pattern.”76 However, there is overwhelming evidence that restrictive land use 
regulations, such as inclusionary zoning policies, have actually contributed 
to higher housing prices and therefore less affordable housing.77 By 
constraining the supply in jurisdictions that adopt inclusionary zoning 
policies, many economists and developers believe that such policies impose 
“additional costs on new residential development” that result in increasing 
housing prices.78 Therefore, while the argument exists for forcing developers 
to include affordable units in new developments, the results speak otherwise. 
Descriptive statistics regarding inclusionary zoning policies reveal that 
there is considerable diversity in the structure and characteristics of these 
programs around the country.79 However, what these statistics also disclose 
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is that the strength of the regional housing market is what drives the impact 
that inclusionary zoning policies have on local communities.80 Thus, these 
inclusionary polices “contribute to increased sales prices of existing single-
family homes during rising regional markets, and may depress local housing 
prices when regional prices decline.”81 So while inclusionary zoning policies 
have the ability to reduce local housing prices and make units in depressed 
housing markets more affordable, they should not be seen as a total solution 
to the problem but rather as a potential hinderance to increasing the overall 
housing supply that could ultimately result in a tenable solution. While these 
policies do still serve a purpose in a possible solution, their overall 
ineffectiveness towards curtailing the problem should highlight that reliance 
on these policies as an ultimate solution is ill-advised. 
B. Tax Abatements 
In many declining communities, local governments have proffered tax-
based incentives to try and curtail the problem of urban decline. One of these 
tax-based incentives is residential property tax abatement programs. The 
logic behind these abatement programs is that “[a]batements as subsidies are 
expected to change consumers’ locational choices through the availability of 
higher-quality homes at lower overall prices.”82 In Cleveland, Ohio, the city 
promoted an abatement program that was designed to promote job growth 
and foster new residential development. The abatements extended to new 
construction residents for 100% of the value of the new residences and thus 
only made home owners responsible for the taxes that were attributable to 
the value of land, which was established as 20% of the sale price of the new 
home.83 For rehabilitation projects, the abatements were extended to the full 
value of the improvements of more than $5,000.84 A study of these abatement 
programs, however, found that the abatements were unable to influence the 
economic decline of the city and “did not create the scale of changes needed 
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to shift the overall patterns of decline.”85 Thus, it was ultimately concluded 
that residential property tax abatement programs can assist in overall job 
creation and “the formation of new companies” in declining areas of a 
community, but “substantial changes in median household income, 
employment levels, tax receipts for local governments, and the removal of 
blighted conditions lie in a robust economy propelled by new jobs and new 
companies.”86 Similar to inclusionary zoning, tax abatement programs for 
residential properties are not a driver of nor a substitute for true economic 
development that can sustain a market of all types of housing. 
C. Tax Increment Financing (TIF) 
On the development-financing side of local government tax-based 
incentives, tax increment financing (TIF) is the most widely used program 
for fostering economic development in the United States.87 The theory behind 
TIF is that the revenue growth generated from new development “will pay 
for physical infrastructure and other expenditures designed to spur further 
economic growth” within the developing area.88 TIF laws vary by state, but 
the basic idea is that a territorial district is created within a city, and a base 
valuation of all the properties within that district is determined with property 
taxes being assessed based on the base value of each property.89 Revenues 
derived from the taxes within that district are then directly set aside “to be 
used for public improvements and other economic development programs 
within the district.”90 TIF-generated funds can be used for numerous 
purposes within the district, including the maintenance and construction of 
physical infrastructure such as “streets and street lighting, curbs and sidewalk 
improvements, bridges and roads, water mains and supply, and sewage 
removal,” as well as for parks and planning upgrades.91 For the most part, “it 
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appears that TIF districts succeed in creating a ‘solid and robust’ revenue 
base” as “[p]roperty values and retail sales in TIF districts generally 
increase.”92 
Local government use of TIFs carries with it the explicit goal of 
increasing the tax base of a district, but they do not necessarily prioritize 
increasing the number of quality jobs or the amount of affordable housing.93 
Fiscalization policies like TIFs have been “sharply criticized by those who 
would like to refocus local planning and development policies on other goals, 
like job creation, improved service delivery, affordable housing, or 
preservation of quality of life.”94 To reform TIF programs, some advocates 
have urged that local governments require a percentage of TIF Funds be 
dedicated to the creation of affordable housing.95 So, in their current 
existence and practice, TIFs do little to create affordable housing, but still 
assist in redeveloping areas to potentially entice further development. 
D. Tax Credits 
Many tax credit projects involve substantial renovations of older 
government housing projects that “are occupied by households with tenant-
based housing vouchers that provide owners with additional revenue.”96 The 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is “the largest and fastest growing 
housing program” in the United States and it is designed to subsidize “the 
construction and renovation of more units each year than all other 
government programs combined.”97 However, while local governments 
frequently use tax credits, their effectiveness towards contributing to a 
solution to the affordable housing problem is uncertain. 
In the United States, “there are . . . about 600,000 homeless people on a 
single night and more than 3 million vacant units available for rent.”98 And 
for the low-income families who are spending a large fraction of their income 
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on housing, tax credits designed to subsidize new construction are hardly 
useful.99 Thus, the problem clearly is not supply in terms of the mass quantity 
of housing produced in a year, but rather a supply problem within the 
affordable subsections of the market on the housing-price-spectrum that is 
certainly lacking. For perspective, the argument for increasing supply to 
solve the lack of affordable housing in this country is not focused on the 
aggregate quantity of housing produced but instead attempts to articulate a 
position where increasing the supply of housing in the affordable brackets of 
the housing-price-spectrum (rather than on the luxury end as is the current 
trend) is heavily encouraged. 
These current tools local governments employ to incentivize 
development are failing to encourage an increase in supply in affordable 
housing that is necessary to correct the spread of urban decline and to 
promote redevelopment of local communities. The current model does not 
work and is simply exacerbating the elimination of affordable housing all 
across the country. Instead, if local governments focused on using under-
utilized tools in their possession instead of relying on tools such as eminent 
domain, and coupled those initiatives with market-based solutions, then the 
necessary reform on the housing market and the reintroduction of 
development of affordable units into the marketplace for consumers can be 
possible. 
IV. GOVERNMENT-SIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING PROBLEM 
A. Overview 
“[S]olutions that move beyond the debate over ‘public use’ versus 
‘public purpose’ must be studied if cities are to address the need for 
affordable housing . . . .”100 
Since Kelo was decided in 2005, government-side solutions to the 
affordable housing problem have been all over the board with little consensus 
over which methods best curtail the problem. The likely reason is that many 
of these solutions, addressed above, simply do not do anything to solve the 
problem but rather only assist to stopgap the dilemma for a temporary period. 
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Today, current legal scholarship on the issue of affordable housing seemingly 
works under the supposition that the government is the solver of all ills and 
is therefore best suited to solve this problem once and for all. The following 
sections detail some of the different government-side solutions that have 
been proposed in recent years. 
B. Exclusionary & Inclusionary Eminent Domain 
Exclusionary eminent domain occurs “when a taking leads to the loss of 
affordable housing and the displacement of residents from one neighborhood 
to another.”101 Under the exclusionary eminent domain doctrine, legal 
scholars propose that “if a municipality did not substitute the low-income 
housing that is condemned for the public purpose of economic 
redevelopment, then the taking is unlawful, and the government may not 
exercise eminent domain.”102 Essentially, for this doctrine to be deemed 
legal, municipalities must provide equitable substitute affordable housing to 
low-income residents displaced by the exercise of eminent domain. Through 
this “[h]eightened judicial review,” the proposed exclusionary eminent 
domain doctrine seeks to rectify what many see as an abuse of the takings 
clause which was promulgated by the Supreme Court in Kelo. 
Under the concept of inclusionary eminent domain, “the incentive for 
developers, primarily, is public support and community cooperation, which 
sometimes is the key to a lucrative return on the condemnation of the land 
anticipated for development.”103 While placing “little, if any, imposition” on 
the courts or legislature, inclusionary eminent domain sets out to encourage 
“a constructive, three-way engagement process and partnership among the 
community, private developer and municipality. . . .”104 The concept is meant 
to show “how private developers and municipalities can reconcile a 
development project in accordance with the needs and wants of the affected 
community,” which include elements such as “meaningful engagement, 
community participation, collective action and public approval.”105 
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On its face, the concept is wonderful in an altruistic sense. However, 
inclusionary eminent domain operates under two incorrect assertions. The 
first incorrect assertion is that developers are willing to prioritize the attitudes 
of the community over their potential return on investment. Generally, 
developers do not prioritize the attitudes of the community over their projects 
unless it affects the willingness of local governments to approve their projects 
or potential renters/buyers from leasing/buying the result of their projects. 
Therefore, to assert that developers are willing to engage in a “three-way 
engagement process and partnership” with local communities is likely 
mistaken. Willing they would not be, but forced, they may be. This goes 
against the whole basis of the inclusionary concept by including developers 
not through their own subjective intent, but by holding their feet to the fire if 
they want to make a living. 
The second incorrect assertion is that municipalities and private 
developers would, generally, be willing to internalize more costs associated 
with a project without being forced to by courts or legislatures. Inclusionary 
eminent domain “encourage municipalities and private developers to 
internalize some of the social costs involved in the taking of land without the 
imposition of affirmative obligations from the courts or the legislature.”106 In 
the face of a multi-million dollar development, to assert that developers 
should be willing to internalize even more costs than they already have to is, 
again, operating under the assumption that it is fair to force a developers to 
do this for the benefit of lower-income groups at the potential expense of 
their business. Such an assumption is anything but inclusionary on the 
developers end. While altruistic in theory, inclusionary eminent domain 
conceptualizes meaningful elements that may very well prove valuable in 
solving the affordable housing problem. However, like so many other 
theories conceptualizing different ways to use the power of eminent domain, 
the theory fails by making the developers the ones to suffer the burdens 
associated with displacement—simply shifting the problem from low-
income residents to developers without even trying to eliminate it altogether. 
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C. Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) 
Often the complications that can be generated by a local government’s 
eminent domain practice “stem from the confluence of various business and 
corporate interests that have influence over government when it carries out 
its authority,”107 usually at the cost of the displacement of low-income 
residents. “The results of the exercise of the eminent domain authority can 
lead to the leveling of large segments of communities, the loss of affordable 
housing, the loss of small businesses, and the destruction of neighborhood 
and community social infrastructure. . . .”108 Broad acceptance of neoliberal 
policies at the local level favors unfettered entrepreneurialism, 
unencumbered free markets, and individual private property rights over 
collective aspirations.109 However, what is often ignored by such policies is 
the “distinction between use values and exchange values, and the fact that the 
benefits derived from the pursuit of exchange values by intensive 
development are unevenly distributed across the community.”110 Thus, the 
disparate impact is magnified as typically the “citizens/residents most 
affected by the economic development decisions [of local government] often 
have little opportunity through democratic channels to participate in the 
decision-making process that is affecting their community.”111 
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) are legally enforceable 
contracts, signed by community groups and by a developer, that lay out a 
range of community benefits that the developer has agreed to provide to the 
community as part of a development project in exchange for the community’s 
support for the project.112 In the context of affordable housing, for 
community advocates and local governments, CBAs can be incredibly useful 
to “enhance opportunities for low-income and working-class communities 
within the context of urban development and revitalization.”113 For 
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developers, CBAs can be beneficial because they can act as “a promise of 
support” which could help “developers negotiate state subsidies and maintain 
good public relations.”114 However, putting so much faith in the willingness 
of developers to prioritize public support may be unwise if doing so comes 
at the cost of losing on their bottom-line. 
While CBAs can work to promote community interests, the flaw in the 
existing CBA model “is that it may fail to galvanize a broad and diverse 
cross-section of the community as stakeholders and participants in the 
decision-making process.”115 This becomes a fatal flaw in the current 
promotion of CBAs towards solving issues of inclusiveness in the housing 
market through affordable housing because in order to achieve inclusiveness, 
CBAs “must have a broad coalition of organizations with demands that bring 
some weight to the negotiation table with municipalities and private 
developers.”116 Thus, if efforts to establish such a broad coalition fail, the 
community advocate’s negotiating power is significantly reduced, and 
questions of the willingness of developers to enter into such binding 
agreements should be raised. 
History has shown that, “accountability has been a problem”117 with 
CBAs. This could demonstrate why CBAs are not influencing developers but 
are acting as hinderances to a free market for development. Legally binding 
developers to enact benefits for the community is again a potential 
destructive model towards encouraging free development by again holding 
developers’ feet to the fire. Nonetheless, the implicit goal of CBAs of 
increasing community participation and involvement still should be able to 
assist in a solution to the shortage of affordable housing. CBAs are ultimately 
designed to be an input mechanism for community stakeholders, but in order 
to have a say in the process, placing such binding constraints on developers 
may not be the best solution. Instead, local governments should be the ones 
accountable for the failure of developers to initiate developments that meet 
the needs of their communities. 
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D. Redevelopment Authorities and Community Development Corporations 
(CDCs) 
One current tool that helps local governments better serve their 
communities and obtain the benefits sought in new developments are 
Redevelopment Authorities. Typically based within distinct geographic areas 
like cities or counties, Redevelopment Authorities are authorized agencies 
within local governments given the public powers of the government to 
promote development.118 While in theory designed to be an intermediary 
between local government, developers, and community shareholders, 
Redevelopment Authorities have frequently put the neoliberal economic 
initiatives of the local governments and developers before the collective 
interests of the community. And while supposed to work autonomously from 
the local government that empowered them, local Redevelopment 
Authorities have become entwined with the economic initiatives of the local 
government such as job creation or expanding the community’s tax base,119 
all the while becoming scapegoats for the government when community 
advocates feel as if those initiatives are not in-line with the benefits they hope 
new developments will provide to the community.  
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are “nonprofit entities 
that seek to improve economically depressed inner-city neighborhoods with, 
among other things, affordable housing to recreate the social fabric of 
distressed areas.”120 As nonprofits, CDCs are completely independent from 
local governments. Therefore, unlike Redevelopment Authorities, CDCs are 
more adequately attuned to the concerns of community stakeholders and care 
little about economic initiatives. Also, while being independent from the 
local government, they provide a private means of fostering redevelopment 
without the use of public power or public money. Instead of relying on local 
government tax money, “CDCs combine several sources of equity and debt 
to construct economic development projects.”121 While operating 
autonomously from local government, CDCs hold the power to work with 
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developers as business partners rather than as a quasi-governmental 
organization applying governmental leverage on developers to comply with 
certain requirements. Thus, CDCs hold the power to economically persuade 
developers to acquire land and then quickly “resell the properties to the 
community at a discount[,] or to buy the land and immediately sell it to the 
CDC so it can construct affordable housing with its investments.”122 This, 
however, is not the only model to which CDCs can work with local 
developers. Alternatively, developers can “negotiate a long-term lease to 
build new affordable housing structures with the affected community,” and 
the CDC, “on behalf of the affected community, would pay the developer the 
property rent.”123 
By taking local government out of the equation, a better relationship 
between developers and the local community can grow through economic 
incentives that are free from government entanglements. CDCs can 
effectively bring local community advocates to the table of government 
discussions on new developments not as a disadvantaged group but instead 
as an economic partner to the development. While not affording 
governmental protections and potentially making community members 
susceptible to economic risks, CDCs are by no means a total solution to the 
problem. Nevertheless, CDCs are likely the best means by which local 
governments can assist communities in solving the affordable housing 
problem by removing themselves from the negotiation table and promoting, 
empowering, and educating their citizens as to the potential benefits from 
organizing a community CDC. 
While these government-side solutions cannot and should not claim to 
be the be-all-end-all solution to the affordable housing problem in the United 
States, they still are incredibly useful solutions to assist in solving the 
problem if coupled with market-based solutions that incentivize supply 
through all sections of the housing-price-spectrum. 
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V. MARKET SIDE SOLUTIONS TO THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROBLEM 
A. Increase Supply 
“Any viable solution (free market or otherwise) must involve increasing 
supply significantly. . . .”124 
As previously articulated, many legal scholars “think the proper line to 
[housing reform] is to require new developments to save a proportion of units 
for low-income residents, which will ensure, they claim, ‘that economically 
diverse neighborhoods and housing affordability will be preserved for 
generations to come.’”125 Free market economists, however, would argue, 
“[t]he implicit assumption behind this position is that government agents 
have enough information to organize complex social institutions, when in 
fact they are slow to respond to changes in market conditions and are often 
blissfully unaware of the many strategies that are needed in different market 
settings.”126 Due to this incorrect assumption, many economists articulate 
that the alternative view is to “abandon the assumption that there is a 
systematic market failure requiring government intervention” and to “remove 
all barriers to entry in the housing market, so that supply can increase and 
prices can fall.”127 These barriers “include an endless array of fees, taxes, and 
permits that grant vast discretionary authority to local officials.”128 Thus, in 
the end, it is likely that the “removal of these burdens will allow [society] to 
harness the private knowledge of developers who will seek to work in those 
portions of the market that hold the greatest profit opportunities.”129 
Critics of this free market approach and many legal scholars alike, often 
fear that “developers will look to build only mansions and high-rise towers 
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to satisfy the endless desires of the millionaire class.”130 However, that 
hyperbole is a stark exaggeration and ignores “every relevant feature of an 
unregulated housing market.”131 In such an unregulated market, costs of 
housing construction and maintenance will decrease due to the ease of new 
entrants into the market across the full spectrum of priced units. With low 
barriers to entry, developers will be able to offer more affordable units to 
people of limited means as some developers, aware of the the luxury market 
trends, will move into niche markets in different neighborhoods where they 
can secure the highest and steadiest rate of return by building more affordable 
housing.132 This establishment of niche neighborhood markets will provide 
expanded supply across a wide variant of prices thus providing more 
opportunities to lower-income tenants. 
No government-side solution alone will “improve the position of the 
developers”133 and therefore by itself, is likely to fail. Legislative proposals 
to add more housing subsidies to the housing market are the most recent 
example in a long history “of ill-conceived policies that increase housing 
demand but do nothing about supply.”134 All over the country median home 
prices are outpacing median household incomes. These results “are largely 
driven by (i) easy access to credit which drive demand and prices ever higher, 
(ii) local land use restrictions and regulations that constrain new supply and 
drive building costs higher, and (iii) housing subsidies that make it even more 
difficult for market rate housing to compete.”135 These “layers of subsidies 
combined with federal, state, and local regulations act to drive up costs while 
simultaneously constraining supply.”136 Regulations such as fixed density 
requirements create a bias in favor of luxury/high square foot apartments 
rather than more economical ones because with such a constricted density, 
developers are going to make the most valued use of the constrained space.137 
It is no wonder that the result of these policies are higher home prices and 
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rents, particularly for the low-income households that these initiatives 
profess to help. 
A city is only affordable in relation to the number of residents it houses 
affordably. Market-based solutions “are the only way to bring home prices 
and rents back in line with median incomes and improve accessibility.”138 
Contrary to the opinions of some legal scholars, market solutions to 
affordable housing “do not include letting developers steamroll small 
property owners through eminent domain abuse, or allowing local 
communities to pass restrictive zoning and permitting requirements that are 
intended to block low-income housing.”139 Instead, the correct approach for 
local governments is “to stop eminent domain abuse, to peel away layers of 
regulation, and to cut out the extensive network of government grants that 
impose strings on how housing can be built.”140 
B. Case Studies 
1. Durham, North Carolina 
After a study conducted on a new residential development constructed 
in Durham, North Carolina, it was determined that “[i]ncreasing the housing 
stock in an area not experiencing rising demand [actually] can lower prices 
in the neighborhood.”141 The theory was that “the positive externalities of a 
project should create a tax increment that covers the debt cost, making the 
redevelopment at worst economically neutral for a municipality while 
contributing to the revitalization of neighborhoods or infrastructure.”142 It 
was thought that new development in one area would increase home values 
in the areas surrounding the new development, making the redevelopment 
profitable to all nearby homeowners while also increasing the local tax base. 
It proved, however, that by increasing the housing supply in an area, the value 
of older housing stock in the nearby area actually declined. While 
contradictory to the hypothesis that the project would have positive 
externalities on the surrounding areas in terms of increased home values, this 
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demonstrates support for the market-based approach to affordable housing. 
Increasing the supply in an area made other properties in that area more 
affordable to lower-income tenants, all the while highlighting the 
ineffectiveness of primarily incentivizing development for tax revenue 
growth. 
New construction in an area or redevelopment “increases the aesthetic 
value of a structure”; this increase, in turn, decreases “the likelihood that 
nearby undeveloped homes are perceived favorably.”143 As a result, “both 
consumers and appraisers lower their value assessments of older homes”144 
in nearby areas around new construction or redevelopment. Therefore, “[i]f 
negative development effects reduce surrounding property values by more 
than the gains of individual properties, policies promoting development 
reduce a municipality’s tax base.”145 Any incentive by the government to use 
regulations on redevelopment to increase their tax base are unfounded, but 
incentives to increase supply through market-based solutions do in fact 
provide for sound economic theory. When supply increases, prices decrease. 
If enough supply is allowed to come to market today, “today’s new 
construction will become tomorrow’s affordable housing.”146 
2. Atlanta Beltline 
In Atlanta, Georgia, a large, multi-use land development project called 
the Atlanta Beltline was examined for the impacts it had on residential 
property values in a neighboring area. The study found that the Beltline “had 
positive effects on housing prices very close [to the redeveloped area] . . . 
with impacts falling off sharply after approximately a quarter mile.”147 The 
findings of the study suggest that large redevelopment projects “have positive 
spillovers on residential property values” within the redeveloped area.148 This 
however, can cause the displacement of lower-income owners who are 
unlikely to be able to afford the taxes on their higher assessed property 
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value.149 Nevertheless, because nearby neighboring areas in Atlanta saw a 
decline in their property values because of the new development on the 
Beltline, these low-income residents living in the immediate area of the 
redevelopment should be afforded the opportunity to liquidate their higher 
valued properties and use the earnings to move into a more affordable area; 
which likely, after the depreciation of their value due to the nearby 
development, could be the neighboring communities less than a quarter mile 
away which, likely, were once too expensive for these low-income families 
to live in before the development arrived. This demonstrates the practical 
effects of supply in the market place driving down costs of older housing 
stock making it more affordable. 
3. Anaheim, California 
In the Platinum Triangle in Anaheim, California, the local government 
agreed that there would be no public incentives or the use of eminent domain 
to achieve development goals.150 Instead, they relied solely on market forces 
to create incentives to drive development. To facilitate the market forces, the 
local government deregulated much of its development process by 
introducing easier permitting, reducing building and environment 
requirements, and overlay zones—designed to promote mixed-use 
developments.151 As a result of this overall streamlined process, the area 
became heavily attractive to developers with property values quadrupling 
within 18 months.152 Today, an estimated $1.2 billion is expected to be spent 
on further construction over the next decade, on top of the $500 million 
already spent.153 When completed, the district is estimated to be home to 
28,000 people when once, no one lived there.154 
Deregulation of the housing market is key. The case studies clearly 
exemplify the role that the government can take on curbing the affordable 
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housing problem by making it easier for the private sector to increase the 
supply of housing across all subsections of the housing-price-spectrum. Due 
to this direct causation between supply and the lack of affordable housing, it 
becomes clear that the current problems regarding affordable housing in the 
United States are best described as a shortage rather than a crisis. 
VI. RECONCILING GOVERNMENT AND MARKET SIDE SOLUTIONS 
Historically, there have been two traditional methods within the United 
States to assemble land—eminent domain and voluntary assembly.155 
Voluntary assembly tends to lead to a holdout problem, while eminent 
domain tends to lead to “a ‘fair market value’ problem resulting in capricious 
redistribution with little regard for the subjective or emotional value of 
property.”156 Nevertheless, in practice, “nimble developers often assemble 
land at better prices than public entities that cannot conceal their ambitious 
area-wide plans from public view long before starting to acquire property for 
public use.”157 The common mistake local governments make when trying to 
fight urban decline and promote redevelopment of their communities is to try 
and act “as both government and the private sector.”158 To find a sufficient 
compromise between both government based and market oriented solutions 
a clear line must be drawn regarding the roles stakeholders play in the 
affordable housing shortage. 
Many Americans “are serious about the sanctity of private property 
because they understand that it is not only inseparable from liberty but also 
the foundation of prosperity.”159 Thus, the exercise of eminent domain is 
often seen as a trampling of homeowner’s individual liberties and the “easy 
path” to redevelopment.160 “[T]oo many government officials want to dictate 
how and where development takes place.”161 This creates the problems noted 
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above where abuses of eminent domain are simply adding to the strife 
brought on to many residents suffering from displacement and urban decline. 
A free market solution where local officials make “zoning requirements more 
flexible and acknowledge market principles,” should help allow new projects 
to move forward “without taking away rights from existing landowners.”162 
Government has a role to play, specifically in easing restrictions and 
streamlining development to help increase the supply of housing on the 
market across the housing-price-spectrum. However, in terms of dictating 
how and where development takes place through exercising eminent domain 
or the use of CBAs, governments should cautiously do so in very limited 
circumstances so as to not abuse their power and add to the plight of urban 
decline and displacement. Instead of using government powers to grab 
people’s land, governments across the U.S. “should find creative ways to 
encourage new enterprises by working with the homeowners and businesses 
already in the community.”163 
To be clear, the use of eminent domain and CBAs in particular do have 
potential benefits to helping encourage redevelopment in local communities. 
Property owners “should not be protected by narrowing the public use 
requirement so much that eminent domain can never be used for economic 
development projects.”164 However, in terms of solving the affordable 
housing shortage it should only be in limited circumstances where these tools 
are considered. 
One circumstance in which it may be appropriate to use government-
based solutions like eminent domain is over the redevelopment of vacant 
houses. Currently, most American cities are dealing with vacant and 
abandoned structures resulting from “population loss, urban renewal, 
fluctuations in housing markets, and poor municipal management over the 
past several decades.”165 These structures remain an eyesore within local 
communities but alternatively, pose a very serious potential solution toward 
the affordable housing shortage. 
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A. Comparative Solution 
1. Rotterdam, Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, city authorities in Rotterdam offered vacant units in 
government-owned housing to potential low-income occupants at almost no 
cost.166 The condition was that in exchange for the property the occupants 
would refurbish the property by investing a minimum of €70,000 (roughly 
$80,000) into their unit and shared facilitates of the block and to live in the 
property for a number of years.167 The approach was deemed a success and 
was adopted under the name kluskuizen.168 A similar approach could just as 
easily work in the United States. 
In Pittsburgh, for instance, the City owns over 3,000 properties, many 
of which are vacant housing.169 Applying a similar approach as the Dutch 
kluskuizen could work to incentivize both the government into releasing the 
supply of these properties back into the market, as well as low-income tenants 
into finding a more reliable path to wealth building through homeownership. 
CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain has a long and checkered past in American history. 
Frequently used as a tool by local governments in the best interest of 
revitalizing declining communities, eminent domain has been a flawed 
exercise from the beginning. Government interference within the 
redevelopment market has only contributed to rising tensions between 
developers and community members over proposed changes to a 
neighborhood. Many community members see local government’s exercise 
of eminent domain as benefiting developers while sacrificing the interests of 
the community. Developers then get frustrated when community members 
object to new development plans and potentially block the approval of these 
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developments even though they are in full compliance with local ordinances 
or codes. In the end, a vicious cycle is built pitting developers against 
community advocates with oftentimes the government stuck in the middle.  
To best help alleviate the tensions between developers and community 
members it was found that creating “an organized platform for participation 
from a diverse set of stakeholders” could be an effective way to help respond 
to the diverse needs of local stakeholders.170 This platform, however, should 
be taken out of city hall and put back into the marketplace. Through the 
existence of CDCs, local stakeholders can become partners rather than 
adversaries. Through the easing of restrictions on the market, government 
actors can stop being the ones to dictate where and how redevelopment exists 
and allow stakeholders within the market, such as developers and community 
members, to determine the demand and thereby supply for new development 
projects. 
While not being fully removed from the revitalization of their 
communities, local governments should be tasked with facilitating and 
streamlining development rather than dictating it. By focusing on 
establishing relationships within the market between developers and 
community advocates, governments should become less aggressive on 
forcing redevelopment. Instead, local governments should use eminent 
domain in limited circumstances such as when vacant units/structures are 
being taken. To promote homeownership through programs like the 
kluskuizen, or to kickstart interest in redevelopment in a particularly 
deteriorating section of the community, eminent domain, in this effect, can 
still be an effective tool to promote demand where there might otherwise be 
none. Overall, the lessons that should have been learned since the realization 
of the effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo is that the role of local 
governments in dealing with the affordable housing shortage needs to be a 
passive one. 
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